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Estate Tax - Simultaneous Death - Problem of Valuing
Decedent's Ownership Interest in Life Insurance Policy
Where a person who is both the absolute owner1 and primary beneficiary
of a life insurance policy and the insured die simultaneously, a question
arises in determining the value of the policy for federal estate tax purposes.
Executors generally contend that the interpolated terminal reserve value
is the proper amount to be included in the deceased owner's gross estate.!
However, the Commissioner seeks to have included an amount equal to the
full proceeds actually paid under the policy.
Decisions rendered in cases involving these facts have differed.! In Estate
of Chown4 the tax court held that an amount equal to the entire proceeds
of the policy is includable in the owner's gross estate.' However, in Old
Kent Bank d Trust Co. v. United States' a Michigan district court held
that the owner's interest is includable in his gross estate at a zero valua-
tion.
I. STATUTORY ESTATE TAX PRINCIPLES
The federal estate tax is calculated as a certain percentage of the dece-
dent's "gross estate." Section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
provides that the "gross estate" of a decedent is the value of all his property
at the time of his death. This section must, however, be read in conjunction
with section 2033," which provides that the property is valued to the ex-
tent of the ownership interest in that property at the time of death. These
two sections relate to all property but make no specific reference to life
insurance.
Valuation of life insurance is specifically provided for in section 2042,'°
but its application is limited to determining the amount includable in the
gross estate of the insured. Under this section, if the insured dies possessed
of the incidents of ownership or his estate is the beneficiary of the policy,
the entire proceeds payable to the beneficiary are included in the insured's
1 Ownership of an insurance policy is determined by possession of the incidents of ownership.
An absolute owner is one who possesses all of the following incidents of ownership: the right to
surrender, cancel, or pledge the policy; the right to borrow on the policy; the right to change the
beneficiary; and any equity of redemption on a pledge policy. W. CASEY, IBP-EsTATE PLANNING
S 16,403.3 (1969).
a "This is not the cash surrender value; it is the reserve which the insurance company enters
on its books against its liability on the contracts. The word 'interpolated' simply indicates adjust-
ment of the reserve to the specific date in question." Commissioner v. Edwards, 135 F.2d 574, 576
(7th Cir. 1943).
' In each of the cases discussed in this Note, the wife was the absolute owner and primary bene-
ficiary of an insurance policy on the life of her husband. Both husband and wife died simultaneously
in a plane crash and the proceeds of the policy were paid to their children as contingent bene-
ficiaries. The facts given, however, represent merely the operative facts of the cases involved. While
minor differences do exist in the cases, they cannot be used to distinguish the conflicting decisions.
451 T.C. 140 (1968).
' Only one month after the Chown decision, the tax court decided Estate of Wien v. Com-
missioner, 51 T.C. 287 (1968), a case in which the facts were substantially the same. This decision,
which cited Chown as authority, reached an identical conclusion.
8292 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
"This case was decided during the period of time between the Chown and Wien decisions.
"lNT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 2031.
9INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, 5 2033.
10 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042.
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gross estate." Even though section 2042 is the only section that makes a
specific reference to valuation of life insurance, this does not mean that the
interest of an owner who is not the insured is not taxable. Section 2033 has
been interpreted as requiring inclusion of any ownership interest in the
policy by a person other than the insured in that person's gross estate. 2
In such a situation the amount includable in the owner's estate is the value
of the policy at his death, rather than the amount of proceeds actually paid
under the policy.'" It should be noted that the estate tax, to be constitu-
tional, must be a tax on a transfer rather than a direct, unapportioned tax
on property." Even though termination of the policy owner's power to
exercise the incidents of ownership may not appear to be the type of
"transfer" necessary, it has been held that termination of the power of the
decedent owner to change beneficiaries is the legitimate subject of a trans-
fer tax."
When life insurance is taxed under section 2033 to the estate of an
owner who is not the insured, the amount includable in his gross estate is
determined by section 20.2031-8 of the Treasury Regulations." Under this
regulation, the amount to be included in the decedent owner's gross estate
can be determined by ascertaining the price for which comparable policies
would be sold by the insurance company." An alternative method provided
by this regulation requires adding the interpolated terminal reserve at the
time of the owner's death to the proportionate part of the last premium
paid before this date which covers the period extending beyond the time of
death."
Under ordinary circumstances, valuation is determined by the selling
price of comparable contracts." Even though this valuation is expressed in
terms of a sale by the insurance company, it is also stated to be the amount
that a "willing buyer" would give a "willing seller" for the contract." The
alternate method," to be used only when the price of comparable con-
tracts cannot be ascertained, provides for using the interpolated terminal
reserve as the base figure and adding a proportionate part of the last pre-
mium. This method is not to be used, however, if the approximation is not
reasonably close to the full value of the policy.
Valuation of an interest in life insurance for inclusion in the decedent's
estate usually does not present great difficulties. Where the owner of the
policy is someone other than the insured and the owner predeceases the
insured, an amount equal to the replacement value2 of the policy is in-
"Commissioner v. Noel Estate, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
"United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1959).
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a) (1), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 417.
4 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
"Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 417.
'
7 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a) (1), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Ctm. BULL. 417.
"Treas. Reg. S 20.2031-8 (a) (2), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 417.
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (1), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 417.
"°Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946).
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (2), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 417.
u The replacement value is the amount it would cost on the effective date to purchase the policy
from the same or another insurance company. DuPont's Estate v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).
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cludable in the gross estate." If, however, the insured predeceases the
owner, there is no estate tax liability upon the owner's subsequent death
because the incidents of ownership are lost when the policy matures and
the proceeds are paid to the beneficiary.'
II. VALUATION IN EVENT OF SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
Where the insured and the owner of a life insurance policy die simul-
taneously, valuation of the policy may become difficult. This is particularly
true when the owner is the primary beneficiary under the policy. Under
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act the insured is presumed to have sur-
vived the beneficiary."5 Because of this presumption the owner-beneficiary
is not entitled to receive the proceeds of the policy. Also, since the property
of each party is disposed of as if he had survived," the insured cannot in-
herit the incidents of ownership from the owner-beneficiary. Since the pre-
sumption of survivorship effects only the distribution of property after
death, the courts have not recognized it as being pertinent in determining
the value of the ownership interest at the moment of the owner's death.
Three valuations are possible for determining the amount to be included
in the deceased owner's gross estate when the insured and the owner-
beneficiary of a life insurance policy die simultaneously: (1) an amount
equal to the full proceeds of the policy, (2) an amount equal to the inter-
polated terminal reserve value of the policy, and (3) no amount, the
property interest being included at a zero valuation. However, the gross,
and hence the taxable, estate of the owner-beneficiary includes only his
property interest at the time of death, 7 so the proper valuation must be
that which most clearly represents this interest.
Even though the presumption of the insured's survivorship precludes the
owner-beneficiary from receiving the proceeds of the policy, the entire
proceeds may be used for valuation purposes." Because it is the ownership
interest, rather than actual receipt of the proceeds that determines the dece-
dent's interest," this valuation may be accurate. The second possible valu-
ation of the policy is the interpolated terminal reserve value."0 This valua-
23Estate of Ethel M. Donaldson, 31 T.C. 729 (1959).
24 The incidents of ownership cannot exist without the insurance policy. Once the policy ma-
tures, the contract is at an end and the incidents of ownership end simultaneously. Even if the
owner received the proceeds as the beneficiary under the policy, the money received would be
merely an asset subject to tax without dependence upon any ownership interest in a policy.
" All three states in which the decisions were rendered had adopted the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act. The section which gives the presumption of survivorship states that if the insured and
the beneficiary die simultaneously, the proceeds of the policy are distributed as if the insured had
survived the beneficiary. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2426 (1960); MICH. STAT. ANN. 5 720.104
(1968); ORE. REv. STAT. § 112.040 (1968).
2 GA. CODE ANN. § 113-906 (1960); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 720.101 (1968); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 112.010 (1968).2 7
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 2033.
" Under Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (1), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 417, the fair market
value of the policy can possibly be equal to the full proceed value. Estate of Chown, 51 T.C.
140 (1968).
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 2033.
20If the circumstances meet those stated in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a) (2), T.D. 6680, 1963-2
CUM. BULL. 417, it may be found, as it was in Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 292
F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1968), that this is the proper valuation.
[Vol. 23
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tion is especially attractive because it is the traditional figure used in de-
termining the interest of the owner when he predeceases the insured. a' Also,
it may be accurate since it is the insurance company's estimate of the value
of the policy at the moment of the owner-beneficiary's death. Finally, the
value of the policy to the decedent owner's estate may be zero." Since un-
der the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act there is a presumption that the
insured survives the beneficiary, it may be argued that the owner-benefi-
ciary had no valuable property interest in the policy. This argument is
persuasive because the incidents of ownership are lost at the exact instant
of the owner's death.
III. ESTATE OF CHOWN AND OLD KENT BANK & TRUST Co.
V. UNITED STATES
The conflict between Chown and Old Kent Bank &q Trust is the result
of differing interpretations of Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-8.3
The tax court in Chown found paragraph (a) (1) of this section appli-
cable because the approximation under paragraph (a) (2 )was not reason-
ably close to the full value of the policy. In reaching the decision, the tax
court relied on a case that did not involve simultaneous death,4 and held
that the policy must be treated as fully matured upon the owner's death.
The court reasoned that as the event of death drew nearer, the owner's
interest increasingly approached the full proceeds value of the policy until
the two amounts became equal at the moment of the simultaneous deaths.
Because under this theory the value of the owner's interest was equal to
the full proceeds value at the time of death, the court determined that the
approximation under paragraph (a) (2) was not "reasonably close to the
full value of the contract."'
Having decided that paragraph (a) (1) applied, and relying on a case
not involving simultaneous death, " the tax court determined that the fair
market value of the policy was equal to the full value of the proceeds,
therefore, this amount was includable in the owner's gross estate. The
court held that the full value of the proceeds was the fair market value
because it was the price at which the policy would change hands between
a "willing buyer" and a "willing seller" at the moment of death.
Contrary to the decision in Chown, the district court in Old Kent Bank
& Trust determined that paragraph (a) (2) of Treasury Regulation section
20.2031-8 applied to the situation. It relied on the fact that the contract
had been in force for some time, that further premium payments were to
be made, and that by the fact of simultaneous death, valuation of the con-
tract was made difficult. The court observed that the policy was not of
" Estate of Ethel M. Donaldson, 31 T.C. 729 (1959).
" Under Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (2), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 417, the fair market
value can possibly be zero if a willing buyer would pay nothing for the ownership interest at the
time of death. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1968).33 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Crm. BULL. 417.
" Estate of James Stuart Pritchard, 4 T.C. 204 (1944).
" Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (a) (2), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 417.6 Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946).
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such an "unusual nature" as would make the approximation under para-
graph (a) (2) "unreasonable." Having found paragraph (a) (2) appli-
cable, however, the court determined that the valuation of the policy in
the owner's estate should be zero rather than the interpolated terminal re-
serve value. In doing so, the court applied the "willing buyer" concept
used in Chown even though it distinguished the case principally relied on
in Chown to establish this concepts' as being inapplicable because it did
not involve simultaneous death.
The district court in Old Kent Bank &q Trust reasoned that the inci-
dents of ownership possessed by the owner-beneficiary were worth nothing
at the instant of death because the proceeds passed to the contingent bene-
ficiaries. Because the deaths of both the owner and the insured were immi-
nent and the proceeds upon their deaths would go to the contingent bene-
ficiaries, the court determined that a "willing buyer" would pay nothing
for the interest transferred from the owner to his estate. The court based
this determination on the fact that it is the interest transferred at death
that is pertinent to valuation, not the value of the owner's interest before
death. It was found that inclusion of the full proceeds in the owner's
estate would not tax the interest at the time of the transfer, i.e., the time
of death. For this proposition, the court relied on a case holding that the
tax must be on the interest transferred at the time of death if the tax is
constitutional."
IV. CONCLUSION
Neither case is entirely correct in its reasoning. However, the decision in
Old Kent Bank & Trust comes nearer to actually using the valuation of
the transfer at the time of death. This is true even though the court found
paragraph (a) (2) of the regulations applicable and yet apparently pro-
ceeded to apply the "willing buyer" test of paragraph (a) (1) in reaching
its decision.
When the deaths of the insured and the owner-beneficiary are simul-
taneous, a proper interpretation of paragraph (a) (1) would yield the re-
sult reached in Old Kent Bank & Trust. Because the deaths are simultane-
ous, it is realistic to say that a "willing buyer" would pay nothing for the
owner's interest since at the instant of death ownership control over the
policy ceases, and the proceeds are payable to the contingent beneficiaries.
Thus, the fair market value of the owner-beneficiaries' interest at the
exact instant of his death would appear to be zero.
The decision in Chown can be questioned because it assumes that the
insured died momentarily before the owner. This assumption appears nec-
essary to justify the result reached in Chown. Since the ownership interest
must be measured at the exact instant of death, this result cannot be justi-
fied.
In cases involving facts similar to Chown and Old Kent Bank & Trust
it seems that paragraph (a) (1) should be applied in the absence of cir-
S7 Id.
" United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
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